Things are their qualities; things are their form--And these in combination, even as bees, Not singly but combined, make up the swarm:
only the science of life but the whole of knowledge. Being the perfect type of inductive scientist, he was only hustled into publication about thirty years later. The particular theory concerning the origin of species which Darwin then propounded was not only incomplete, but in some measure positively erroneous. Not only did he share our persisting ignorance of the antecedents of those natural variations which form the sine qua non of evolution, but he lacked even such knowledge as we now possess of the differences in germinal structure which constitute the start of such variations. Further, Darwin erred positively with regard to transmission of acquired characters, and by over-estimating the r6le of natural selection.
Yet Darwin's name is rightly immortal, because he and his followers firmly established the principle that in biology, as in respect of non-living processes, the whole business of science is to account, as far as is possible, for events as a sequence in the phenomenal world, without reference to intervention of spiritual entities extrinsic to that world, and persisting unchanged throughout the sequence.
In respect of the origin of species, Darwin's attitude was not only opposed to theistic explanations, but to others framed in terms of more individual triumphs of the spirit (e.g. the wish-fulfilment view of the neck of the giraffe as suggested by Lamarck).
After a period during which theories of evolution without spiritual guidance were widely derided as blasphemous nonsense, Darwin's central principle triumphed.
From its particular application Darwin's non-interventionist principle spread to the whole of biology; it inspired all the physical sciences then, and (despite sporadic regressions towards animism) has continued to do so ever since.
It is now suggested in a centenary spirit, that in framing a science of the conduct and consciousness of man and other animals, it would not be premature to try and conform with the principle which Darwin initiated. This is particularly so, since OCT.-PSYCH. 1 Darwin indicated by example his own belief that the proper data and methods for establishing a science of the behaviour of animals were analogous to those for elucidating the genesis of their form.
To put the matter more explicitly, it is suggested that the primary requisite of a scientific psychology and psychiatry is agreement that these shall not be framed in terms of animist conceptions, nor include reference to such assumptions, which properly belong to religion and in fact form the sole common features of religion.
There is no need to be deterred by the failure of previous attempts (such as Watsonian behaviourism and various reflexologies) which have been marred by extravagances such as exclusion of -the phenomenal facts of consciousness and of almost all influence of the innate. A special resistance, reminiscent of the days of Huxley, may be expected in the cases of psychology and psychiatry to this thesis of the incompatibility of science with animism. It has to be noted 'that the tendency tov-ards idealism in various other sciences has been specially evident of late. Prominent exponents proclaim the belief that the inductive method is for ever incapable of giving an exhaustive account of the phenomena constituting the particular province of each science. These partisans of the spiritual insist (notwithstanding all historic evidence to the contrary) that the scientific method must inevitably leave a residue of data soluble only by resort to animist conceptions. Though in biology, in chemistry and physics particular exponents may proclaim this defeatism as their personal faith, there is no actual suggestion that these sciences as such would profit by being recast to incorporate reference to spiritual agencies. This is reserved for the so-called sciences of psychology and psychiatry. It is in these alone that one finds leading authorities laying down that accounts should deliberately be framed in terms of animist concepts as the method of choice, and thence proceeding to the doctrine that alleged success in thus summarizing phenomena (in reality a triumph of circular argument) constitutes entitlement to scientific status.
Here it may be opportune to emphasize that protest against confusion between the scientific and religious approach need not involve anything derogatory to the latter. Many scientists of course (including some of the greatest) openly profess that there are problems incapable of solution by the scientific method, but soluble in some other way, in virtue of revelation, tradition, intuition and so forth. Some hold that the private certainty of belief about such idealist concepts as God and the Soul has a more ultimate kind of validity than the public probability claimed for knowledge achieved by induction. So long as the distinction between belief and knowledge is preserved, such statements call for no protest in the name of science, which knows nothing about certainty-not even its existence. It might perhaps he agreed by all that the province of religion begins where that of science necessarily leaves off. But such an agreement does not justify identifying scientific knowledge with religious belief and does not alter the fact that animism involves making certain assumptions, e.g. indeterminism and purpose (using this term in a finalist sense) and that these assumptions are incompatible with the scientific method and would render it invalid.
A typically lucid statement of the position which I want to controvert may be quoted from Hart.' " Freud introduced dynamic concepts while still remaining within the psychological field. He did not confine himself to those first two stages of science, the observation and classification of phenomena, which had hitherto constituted the only ground in which the psychologist was allowed to play. He advanced to a third stage, construction of causal concepts designed to explain the observed phenomena. Moreover, these concepts were built out of psychological stuff and not handed over in despair to the ministrations of the physio-1 My criticism of Hart betokens the facts that I think him the only English builder of psychiatry who has seriotusiy examined its foundationls and that I disagree with him diametrically as to their present state and proper nature. 28 1688 logist and the chemist. This was an epoch-making step, and one which if it can be established at once raises psychology to a level with the other scientific disciplines which serve psychiatry."
Of psycho-analysis Hart says:-"This will remain the first consistent attempt to apply to medicine a conceptual psychology along the lines which have proved so fertile in other branches of science, and have at last thrown more light upon neurotic disorder than any other method. The formulations of the psychoanalyst do enable us to interpret in psychological terms the conditions with which the psychiatrist has to deal. The psychoanalyst can claim that his method has indubitably achieved greater success than any other so far as psychoneuroses are concerned, and perhaps, not had less success in the sphere of the psychoses."
With these quotations must be coupled the fact that the psychological conicepts of Freud and of McDougall (whom Hart also extols) are definitely animistic. I venture to suggest in the first place that, as regards real progress of scientific knowledge concerning psychology and psychiatry within the last generation, such optimism is entirely misplaced: in fact, that the rate of this has been deplorable.
In my view retardation has largely been due in psychiatry to distraction from painstaking factual studies of the sort which Kraepelin initiated by the facile charms of animist speculation.
Verifiable facts are only available about certified insanity; except as regards general paral'sis and alcoholic psychosis there has been no reduction in incidence, in duration or in ultimate prognosis of any form of this. There has been largescale organization of the treatment of minor mental disorders but any success achieved is mainly due to wider application of knowledge available long before Freud. The rate of progress has been quite different in respect of the spread of information concerning real or alleged findings among the profession and the public. But such diffusion of current doctrines, opportunities for application of these in practice, and even facilities for research, have to be sharply distinguished from real movement in the frontier of knowledge. We, who after most of a generation in psychiatry, are doubtless about to die intellectually, can congratulate our successors upon the instruments which have been forged in our time for discovery. In particular, the newer institutions designed to deal with beginnings of mental disorder in childhood and in adult life, should furnish the chance to make the origin and progress of mental disorder a matter of record rather than reminiscence. But scientific results from these instruments so far are meagre.
For a variety of reaso-ns which it would take too long to expound, animist speculations have obtained a high prestige among the lay intelligentsia-significantly greater than among professio,nal psychologists and psychiatrists who are directly concerned with the facts which these speculations purport to explain. The situation is like that in respect of the allied movement among those professing subjective idealism in physics. In each case there is a strong tendency to suggest that acceptance is synonymous with modernity, and opposition with reaction. It is therefore relevant to note that the greatest of English physicists expressed his estimate of the respective contributions to his science made on the one hand by idealist speculation, and on the other hand by observation and experiment in the oracular utterance, " The dogs bark, and the caravan moves on."
Holt said more than ten years ago: " It has taken man ages to learn that gaps in his knowledge cannot be filled with figments of his own imagination. Psychology has not learnt this lesson."
NOMINALISM OR CONCEPTUALISM ?
Definitions.-It is the essential proposition of this address that the most fundamental choice confronting psychologists individually and collectively is that between nominalism and conceptualism and that this choice is that between the way of science and the way of religion. In discussing this proposition, it will be necessary to employ certain terms which have been used even in philosophy with alternative and in some cases with contradictory senses. Some of the terms also have a popular usage which is quite remote from their meaning in philosophy. The following definitions are selected, with slight modifications, from those given in each case by the Oxford English Dictionary.
(1) Nominalism is a doctrine of which the more negative aspect is that universals or abstract concepts are mere names without any corresponding realities; the positive aspect (phenomenalism) of the same doctrine is that phenomena are the only objects of knowledge. (By phenomena, of. course, are meant immediate processes of perception.)
In practice either term denotes a manner of thinking which considers things from the point of view of phenomena only.
(2) Conceptualism may be used as a term embracing both: (a) Materialism and (b) Idealism, i.e. as the direct opposite of nominalism and inclusive of both these alternatives.
(a) Materialism is the doctrine that the physical world has independent reality; that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications and that the phenomena of consciousness are wholly due to the operation of material agencies.
(b) Idealism or spiritualism is any system in which the object of external perception is held to consist (either in itself or as perceived) of ideas.
(i) Subjective idealism is the opinion that the object of external perception consists (whether in itself or as known to us) of ideas of the perceiving Mind.
(ii) Absolute idealism is the opinion that it consists not only as known to us, but in itself of ideas-not however ours, but those of a universal Mind. Thus absolute idealism corresponds to panpsychism. The really living form of this conflict in psychology and psychiatry-and indeed, in science generally-is that between nominalism and the idealist variety of conceptualism. Materialism as defined above is defunct-if indeed it ever existed, except as a mythical butt. It is more than doubtful that it was ever seriously held by the leading scientists of any time-although attempts to father such views upon their opponents are common among idealists.
The issue between nominalism and idealism is both ancient and modern. Its persistence throughout history would seem to correspond to the existence (in respect of cognition) of a pair of contrasting trends in human personality. Jung equates inclination towards nominalism or towards conceptualism respectively with the cognitive aspect of extraversion and introversion.
In the main the disposition to nominalism or conceptualism corresponds to "Tough-mindedness " or "Tender-mindedness" as distinguished by James. But Jung classifies as essential certain of the contrasting pairs of characters ascribed by James to his two groups and as non-essential certain of the others.
The following table represents, with some slight rearrangement (mainly suggested by Jung) the antithesis originally suggested by James: (1) Idealist. Conceptnalist.
(2) Sensationalist.
(2) Intellectualist. (3) Fatalist. Causalist.
(3) Free Willist. Finalist. (4) Pluralist.
(4) Monist. (b) Less essential:-(5) Irreligious.
(5) Religious. (6) Sceptic.
(6) Dogmatist. (7) Pessimist.
(7) Optimist.
COMMENTARY ON TABLE.
(1) More essential characteristics.-It may have been true in the day of William James to say, as he did, that the tough-minded was a materialist. Now that it is common knowledge that matter and all its sub-divisions-molecules, atoms, electrons-are conceptual fictions, it would be more true to say that the toughminded is a nominalist. This will make no difference to the idealist's view of him as a heathen in his blindness bowing down to wood and stone. But if the nominalist is now free from doubt about the conceptual nature of Matter, he is at least as clear concerning the hypothetical nature of any unity dubbed Mind. For the nominalist the thoughts themselves are the thinker, pending any proven usefulness of the opposite view as an instrument for the discovery of unknown phenomena. The distinctive feature of nominalism is retention of awareness that words are just symbols, designed to express observed sequences of phenomena (whether subjective or objective). To the strict nominalist a " thing " is merely a term for a recurrent pattern of concurrent sense impressions. Abstract nouns are terms for the very fact of recurrence of such concurrent patterns. For the nominalist, all symbolsgestures, words, figures alike-are tokens easing exchange; they are merely alternatives to more concrete forms of barter, such as pictures. For the nominalist the coinage of words, which admittedly are inconvertible for ever into terms of phenomena, is merely debasing the currency of thought. To him the conceptualist's practice of accounting for the unknown in terms of the unimaginable is just verbiagea children's game with valueless counters.
For the conceptualist, words, especially those denoting universals of any kind, tend to have a totally different significance. The classic example of conceptualism is the statement attributing to a soporific principle the fact that opium produces sleep. To the conceptualist it seems satisfactory to "explain" phenomena by the invention of ad hoc entities and "forces " subsisting somewhere that is nowhere and endowed with exactly the capacities required to account for the phenomena, already observed. Taking words that should be regarded as merely collective terms for classes or sequences of phenomena, devoid of any perceptible relation in spacetime, the conceptualist reifies these words as if they stood for "things" in the sense in which a nominalist would use that term. So far we have considered only a neutral form of conceptualism from which might be derived either materialism, idealism or dualism (i.e. a combination of these two realisms). A distinctive change occurs when the idealist breathes into the symbols which he has created the breath of life and attributes phenomena to their free-will as first cause. By the idealist, collective terms tend to be not merely reified, but animated. Those denoting activities are treated as if agencies, as if not merely living, but as if persons. Thus from the reifications of abstractions, which is the primary and common form of conceptualism, there follow as idealist derivatives animation, personification, and the development of deities by projection. Eventually the idealist claims that the very lack of correspondence of his verbal concepts with anything perceptible, their timeless quality and absence of spatial relations, give them a superior kind of " reality." It is hard to discover what exactly the term "reality " here implies -beyond approbation. However, to many it seems as senseless to question the reference of the phenomena of human behaviour to the mind or soul as to our ancestors did doubts about demonology and witchcraft.
Actually such reference is a sample of the same animism as was described by Tylor in " Primitive Culture," that by which the savage accounts for every process in the universe which he does not understand-thunder, the wind, and the flow of the river, as well as activities constituting life-by ascribing it to a spirit exercising the free will which he imagines himself to possess.
(2) The nominalist in science is interested in the study of phenomena; to him point by point correspondence with prior experience and the capacity to lead on to novelties in experience are the crucial tests of value. The idealist is interested in formulations and patterns per se. The typical idealist is the pure mathematician totally indifferent as to that for which his symbols stand.
(3) To the nominalist, the determining quality of conscious purpose and free will, the influence of that which is extrinsic to the phenomena and of that which is to come, seem as completely illusory as the once self-evident beliefs in the geocentric universe and the creation of all in the heavens and on earth for man's temporal pleasure and eternal profit.
(4) Nominalism emphasizes induction from particular instances to general rules; idealism favours deduction from the general to the particular. Idealism tends to proclaim the empire of one principle, nominalism towards the slow federation of independently established formule. Less essential characteristics.
If we consider the--attributes of the Tough and Tender as tabulated, we find that the tough or nominalist type is alleged to be irreligious, sceptical and pessimistic. Commonly, though not constantly, these adjectives apply in a limited sense. To the idealist with his zest for circular argument it seems adequate to explain all human behaviour and consciousness by ascribing them to a Soul, or Entelechy, or Mind, according to the vogue at the moment of religion. In the same way, all problems of the cosmos can be solved by invoking deities and their ways. If the time is more scientific this ultimate personification can always be termed the Universal Spirit, or Nature, or the Life Force.
The nominalist has no such ready resources: he is too crude for the subtleties which distinguish one of these explanations as a part of science, and the rest as religion. He sees all religions as the idealist sees all but one. Even if he holds a belief in the existence of subjective purpose and control of the cosmos, the strict nominalist will probably doubt the capacity of man to imagine the nature of either. He may even doubt whether if they exist they are inspired by ethical values obviously derived from the expediencies of a reproductive and gregarious animal. But a reasonable nominalist would, of course, no more deny to a scientific colleague the right to hold, when not on duty in his own field, any of the numerous varieties of animism, than the right to belong to one of the equally numerous sections of Liberal or Labour Parties. On the contrary, he may well think that these private orgies of certainty are a good thing in the bleak life of a scientist.
The nominalist is said to be sceptical and pessimistic. If these adjectives mean that he is apt to rate less high the achievements of the present and the prospect of a personal future, perhaps this is true. So far as biological usefulness is concerned, this seems not to matter. Most of us have heard of the wasp that (heedless alike of subjective purpose and vegetarian scruples) stings in every segment and so paralyses the caterpillar, thus making it a living larder for the grubs no mother wasp has ever seen.
Here anticipating criticism, it is necessary to say that one is perfectly aware of the paradox that consistent nominalism is itself a conceptualist fiction, that the nominalist is a personification, not a person; in fact one might say that the strict nominalist does not exist, but he knows it.
However, there is no doubt whatever that nominalism, steering between the assumptions of idealism on the one hand and those of materialism on the other, is the essence of science. Mere number and even repute of adherents of a scientific theory is immaterial in comparison with more impersonal criteria. We must beware of the appeal to authority, against which modern science was a revolt.
Apart, from the conscious reservation of certain themes as the sphere of influence of religion, many scientists unconsciously substitute belief for knowledge. All scientific education commonly fails quite to eradicate the conceptualism ingrained 1692 320 since childhood in thought and almost unavoidable in language; this tends to crop out as a belief either in the superior reality of a hypothetical subsisting entity termed "Matter," or as a conviction of the sole ultimate reality of another universal termed "Mind." So long as it is recognized that such beliefs are matters of personal feeling having no claim to general validity, no harm is done.
It is rather common nowadays to mock at the naivett of those physicists whose writing seems to indicate materialist beliefs in the reality of atoms, electrons, forces, quanta, and so forth. Despite carelessness of expression the great majority of physicists for a generation (since Mach and Pearson) have been alive to the nature of these concepts.
Anyhow, charges of naivetM would be out of place unless equally extended to all idealists (e.g. Freud), who regarded spiritual entities-Mind and all its subdivisions -as objective realities.
If, like Jung, we largely equate predominant extraversion with nominalism, predominant introversion with idealism, and if we believe that such dominant tendency of the individual to introversion or to extraversion is of very early origin if not innate, then we should see that what constitutes private truth for every individual is a subjective problem depending on the standard with which each seeks conformity.
If it were agreed that the varying receptivity shown by individuals to the Freudian among other idealistic psychologies is rooted in something as old and fundamental as the controversy between nominalism and idealism, then in much of current controversy each party might possibly be less offensive to the other. We might be less disposed to think that the only possible explanations were amentia, dementia, or moral anomalies. We might be less prone to think that any purpose is served by bandying backchat about sexual perversities. If we recognize that the coniflict is one that has gone on for thousands of years as to what constitutes reality and truth, then we might even agree to differ about an insoluble problem.
The exponents of psycho-analysis might be less sure that resistance is rooted in pre-senile conservatism of its opponents; they might be less confident that a little salutary superannuation will shortly ensure the triumph of their truth. The opponents of psycho-analysis might at least show the tolerance which is customary towards the religion of others, though this would not involve acceptance of claims stated in terms that are contrarv to definition-such as that psycho-analysis is science.
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Hart's discussion of the philosophy of psychiatry has made most of us familiar with the preliminary question as to nature of a science. Science is distinguished by its subject matter, which is sequence of phenomena, and specially by its aims and methods. George Henry Lewis perhaps stated the matter most tersely when he said:
"Science aims at the power of pre-vision based upon quantitative knowledge."
Stated more fully, the goal of science is the production of formulh summarizing the maximum number of past phenomena in the simplest, most concise and most frugal manner possible, and enabling us to foretell the sequence of future phenomena with the maximum economy of thought.
It must be emphasized that the satisfactions which science seeks are intellectual ones, and particularly the power of forecast. It is no necessary part of science to give practical control, and the power to do this has no direct bearing on scientific truth. Otherwise every foolish dogma, whether political or religious, used to produce unity in the body politic, would be true so far as effective; each of the current devices for making a desert in the province of thought and calling it peace, would be equally scientific. This should be borne in mind in considering whether the claims of psycho-analytic theory as science are much strengthened by any effect its application may have in harmonizing the lives of neurotics. Questions involving the validity of nominalism or of conceptualism-the most crucial problem of knowledge-cannot be settled by assertions about the power to do this, especially when the degree and attributability of the alleged improvement cannot be verified owing to the privacy of the application. Even evidence of discovery incidental to work on a given theory is not enough to prove it science. Proof must be forthcoming that there is inseparable connexion between the theory and such phenomenal knowledge as has been created by its exponents. Astrology and alchemy, the quest of the philosopher's stone, of the elixir of youth, and of perpetual motion, all led to real discoveries incidental to work based on totally false hypotheses. It is essential to remember that the sole criterion of whether a theory is scientific consists in the extent to which, on examination, it is found to conform to the recognized requirements in respect of observation and interpretation.
It has been emphasized by Hart that the logical (if not necessarily the historic) course of a science consists of three stages: (1) Observation of phenomena, i.e. of sensory data; (2) classification of these; (3) the induction of conceptual formulae to summarize them.
As regards methods of observation, there are three primary demands of science, failure to satisfy which nullifies the eligibility of any material proposed for interpretation. First, the methods of observation must be public methods. Secondly, these methods must permit of discrimination how far any observation is truly impersonal. Thirdly, no scientific method can be held to have any promise unless it lends itself ultimately to quantitative resuilts. This is closely related to the determinist character of science.
I venture to suggest doubt concerning the tenability of a distinction between classification and conceptual formulation of sequences. All categories and heads of classification are conceptual, though their nature as such is often ignored by their creators. The distinction between classification and formulation is often nil; moreover, both are apt to be followed by the same processes of reification, animation and personification.
The crucial discrimination is really that between observation and interpretation. This is the same as distinction between news and views, taught to every reporter and ignored by every editor.
Verifiability is essential to the value of hypotheses. In science there is need to be cautious with those who claim many and fundamental advances. It should be remembered that mere novelty is no great claim, as the files of any patent office would show.
Charles Darwin said: "I have steadily endeavoured to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis however much beloved (and I cannot resist forming one on every subject) as soon as the facts are shown to be opposed to it." If psychiatry is to progress, it is necessary that free speculation should be encouraged, but also that the conditions of such encouragement be those which Darwin indicated and observed. It is desirable that an investigator should constantly be seeking a formula which will cover even two phenomena. But it is essential that such a formula shall be kept to oneself until tested, not proclaimed as truth. The only mode of trial is the search by deductive reasoning for a third phenomenon which must logically have certain characters if the formulation be correct. Until such check has been applied, and quantitative coincidence of experience with expectation is publicly demonstrable a formula is without proof or value; if permanently incapable of such tests, it is useless. It was submission to such crucial objective tests that established the theory of relativity and that broke the phlogiston theory.
Regarding interpretation in general, one need only mention again the necessity of simplicity, conciseness, and comprehensiveness as requirements of any scientific theory. Comprehensiveness covers not merely self-consistence, but also consistence with all known observations in the same field of knowledge and continuity with the rest of science. Now as to economy of hypothesis. I think it is this requirement which is utterly destructive of the idealist theories which have recently dominated psychiatry. It is true that in construction of scientific formulm, subject to explicit announcement of the liberty one is taking, one is free to make such assumptions or hypotheses as are indispensable. But the scientific quality of a formula is not enhanced by its content of assumption. On the contrary this quality is exactly in proportion to the reduction of assumption to a minimum. That is the principle of William Occam's razor.
As shown in the first quotation given above, Hart, in a typically idealist manner, makes of introducing conceptual fictions into formulm summarizing the sequence of phenomena a positive merit, in fact a sine qua non of scientific psychology.
It really cannot be maintained that " construction of causal concepts built out of psychological stuff" is the sine quta non of a scientific psychology. Spearman's work consists essentially in the discovery of methods for measuring quantitatively certain intellectual phenomena, and assessing the individual efficiency in respect of these. Everyone would agree that Spearman's work is psychology, and that exact quantitative study of this sort is typically scientific. Yet it should be noted that Spearman gives three theories of the nature of " g," of " s " and of other factors, every one of which refers them to a property of the brain not of any extraphysical mind.
Hart appears to underrate the utter objectivity of real modern science. Its ultimate aim is neither materialist nor idealist. Modern physics as viewed by experimentalists is essentially concerned with events and with their sequence in space time. It is completely agnostic as to objective existence of entities which endure between those events. Almost any modern physicist would admit that the electron is essentially a symbol for the location of certain phenomenal events in space time, and may be no more.
Psychology should be as lucidly sceptical. Its pride should be not in the introduction of conceptual entities of a subsisting kind, but in reduction of reference to them. If for the sake of brevity one were to distinguish between things, thoughts and thinkers, then one might say that a scientific psychology should be clear about thoughts as being the sole object of direct knowledge, and be utterly agnostic as to the very existence of either things or thinkers. It might find the postulation of either of the latter a convenient symbol, but should be on its guard about confusion between usefulness as a symbol and existence as phenomenon.
Here we must distinguish between hypotheses of two kinds. Those on the one hand postulating entities and processes which are potential objects of direct sense perception (although for such reasons as imperfection of methods and instruments they have not yet become so) and those on the other hand postulating entities and processes which admittedly could never become perceptible.
Postulation of the first or verifiable type, in response to the challenge offered by apparent discrepancies and irregularities, has led to some of the greatest discoveries. Here belong the forecast of unseen planets, of the elements missing from the periodic table, of the elements which mixed with atmospheric nitrogen made its properties differ quantitatively from these of pure nitrogen as derived from compounds. To-day a similar challenge is presented, to which I shall refer later, namely, that involved in the principle of indeterminacy. To this the idealists wish to respond by extending the concept of free will to the physical universe.
As to the second type of postulation, the attempts to account for the unknown in terms of the unimaginable, to explain the sequence of phenomena by the intervention of verbal entities having no such conceivable relation to space time as could ever render them objects of direct perception, surely this is out of fashion in science.
Of course modern science is a scheme for representation by static symbols of the sequence of phenomena which form its subject matter. Even the translation of music into notation is representation of the sequence of phenomena transient in time by a subsisting set of spatial symbols. In the same way, in psychology, if it were freely admitted that description of the Mind or the Soul and of its parts was only a spatial diagram representing the temporal sequence of mental processes of several varieties, then these terms would be less objectionable. If used as the name of anything which abides, then one might as well talk of bits of the wind.
Further, science has always been pluralistic and addicted to explanation in terms of a multitude of minimals. It has fipished with Matter and Ether, and with grandiose generalities of that kind. At a time when physics has lately discarded the materialist view of Matter and Ether, it hardly seems appropriate to term psychology scientific in virtue of the idealist embodiment in its theory of the Conscious and Unconscious Mind, the Id and Ego and Superego. Formerly, Hart repeatedly emphasized an analogy between assumption of the Unconscious Mind, and the weightless fictionless Ether-their equality as concepts. This equality for scientific purposes may be conceded; they will soon be merged in the equality of death, though doubtless they will survive in popular language.
It might be said that postulation of minor subsisting entities of a psychological order, e.g. ideas, complexes, instincts, was comparable to assumption of electrons, atoms and molecules. Possibly this is true, but if so, psychology must be as clear as is physics about the wholly symbolic quality of all these alleged entities persisting between phenomenal processes which alone can be directly known. Thus we get back forty years to agree with William James, that an idea persisting between its successive appearances in consciousness is as mythical an entity as the Jack of Spades.
There is not the least doubt that members of the idealist schools in psychology are wholly blind to this view and regard their various anthropomorphs as being at least as objective as postulates of the verifiable type.
As for matter, so for energy, as for the electron so for the quantum. The general concept of physical energy is not to be regarded as anything which persists or compels, but as a convenient measure of equivalence in the sequence of physical events of various kinds. In the same way, terms like life force, 6lan vital, horme, libido, et hoc genus omne, could have no justification except as analogous measures of the equivalence of events in the mental series. I have always had difficulty in understanding the glow which some psychopathologists of our time get from the blessed word dynamic. By a queer twist the word dynamic is used in psychology for those varieties of explanation which consist in referring events to static entities, and to the power of these to exercise compulsive forces.
Of such subsisting entities, the most widely popular are the conceptual instincts. Hart says that the various instincts can be regarded as driving forces, that this enables us to conceive the sequence of thought and behaviour in man as a result of the interplay of various instinctive forces and thus provides a dynamic standpoint, lifting psychology above the level of a mere descriptive science. Thus it is no longer limited to recording the how of phenomena but can attempt an answer to the question " Why."
To the nominalist the question " Why" in a sense different from How" is unanswerable, and the idealist answer seems verbiage.
The first thing about which to be perfectly clear is that conceptual instincts" as opposed to " instinctive processes" are merely heads of classification.
McDougall's own well-known definition relates instincts to " objects of a certain class." What makes up a " class" depends on the caprice of the observer. If the unity of the " class " were based on anything objective, e.g. on any such fact as that an instinct consisted of a given set of reactions which varied jointly in heredity or that the set was jointly activated by administration of some gland extract, or that it was abolished as a set by any known lesion whether morbid or experimental, then in such case there would be objective evidence for regarding the " Instinct " so called as a unity. There is no such evidence in the case of McDougall's, Freud's or any other known list, and anyone has equal rights to make another list.
In 1918 I was billeted in a kitchen with a brick-tiled floor. I had a kitten which had been separated from its mother as soon as its eyes were open. There was snow outside, and the kitten could not go out. In fullness of time it developed a practide of scrabbling at the brick floor with its front paws, turning round and defeacating and then scrabbling again in a typically feline and perfectly futile attempt to cover up its feaces. This homely instance illustrates just what one means.
We have here beyond question a pretty example of an instinctive process: but of what instinct in the grand sense is it a manifestation? You can take your choice.
(1) You can assemble this behaviour with the practices which all cats have of washing their faces with their front paws, scratching their ears with their hind feet, and licking their kittens, and so construct a sanitary or toilet instinct.
(2) You can emphasize that the cat is a solitary hunting animal with no use for publicity, while the dog on the other hand is an animal hunting in packs. It is possible that the behaviour of a cat in deftecating stealthily and that of the dog urinating against every upright object, are features of their different hunting instincts.
(3) To the psycho-analyst, presumably, their behaviour would be manifestations of anal erotism and urethral erotism respectively, and analogous to the burial of treasure and the display of it. We should be invited to regard the rest of the differences in the character of the cat and dog as consequent.
"There are five and forty ways of constructing tribal lays, And every single one of them is right." It is difficult to understand how Hart can regard as an addition to science the idea of Instinctive or any other Forces driving anything. His Philosophy of Psychiatry was largely based on Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science. Karl Pearson dismisses the notion of force as a cause of motion; as he says, the idea of forces as compulsive entities is one borrowed from animist theories of human activity. The notion arises as a projection of a sense impression in ourselves and how this subjective phenomenon can cause motion in the physical world would puzzle even a metaphysician to suggest. Force is not a cause but a measure of motion; it is merely a description of the routine of experience.
Coupling these lines of argument, one may reasonably ask whether reference of behaviour to the " driving of Instinctive Forces " is really likely to serve as an instrument of discovery.
The next points to be considered are the essential character in science of determinism in the sense of causality, and the sense in which the conception of purpose is reconcilable with science. Unless there be order in the sequence of phenomena, there cannot be the foreknowledge of the future which is the goal of science. This applies as much to psychology as to physical science. Determinism and causality are the essence of science, as indeterminism and free will (i.e. the influence of extrinsic universals upon phenomena) are the sine qua non of religion. To the extent that such influence is credited, science is impossible. Therefore, science must exclude reference, not only in particular instances but in general principle, to the intervention of free will and such first causes.
It is necessary, however, to be clear as to the limited meaning of causality in science. Causality is merely an affirmation of the probability that given antecedents will be followed by the same consequences as have hitherto occurred in the routine of experience. Science as a method is a quest of probabilities; as a body of doctrine it is a statement of probabilities. Probability is proportional to the frequency with which a sequence has already been publicly observed. But this implies excluding the intervention of first causes. If the possibility of these were admitted calculation of probabilities would be stultified.
The essential method of science is induiction. Inductive knowledge can never attain certainty: only belief can do this. Inevitability or the existence of some extrinsic compulsion is no part of scientific determinism. There is a well-known metaphysical limerick.
There was a young man who said " Damn! It grieves me to think that I am A body that moves In determinate groves, In fact not a bus but a tram." This is contrary to scientific determinism, since tram-lines stretch fore as well as aft.
The so-called psychological determinism of Freud, affirming the entire independence of a mental series of phenomena from all others, is not determinism in the scientific sense, but the extreme negation of this.
I wish now to turn to the questioDs of how far the concept oI purpose is compatible with science in general, and particularly how far the concept of purpose can be reconciled with a scientific (i.e. determinist) psychology. Difficulty as usual arises from the employment of a nebulous word in many senses, and most of this would disappear if the word " purpose " were replaced by a number of terms each with an exact meaning. The word may mean firstly objective purpose, i.e. adaptation obvious to an observer, or secondly subjective purpose, i.e. the consciousness of this by the subject. Confusion is created by flitting from the one sense to the other and ignoring their independence.
Objective purpose or better, adaptation, is a universal character of life. It is clearly inherent in vegetable as in animal organization, it is as evident in persistent structure as in reactions.
With many closely adapted animal responses at low level, there is no evidence even suggesting association of consciousness. It is axiomatic about instincti'e processes that consciousness of the end to which objectively they seem directed is not indispensable. There therefore seems no justification when analogous adaptation occurs at a higher level, for asserting that of this adaptation the subjective consciousness is a necessary prerequisite. The subjective consciousness of purpose is, of course, a correlate of the adapted action, but the unsolved problem of their correspondence is that of the mind-body relation generally. The compatibility of "purpose" with science seems to turn on whether the implication is that events depend wholly on the past, or in part on the future, in fact whether by purpose one implies a causalistic or finalistic view. Recognition of causalistic adaptation, e.g. of adapted structure reached in the species in virtue of survival value, or of adapted reaction patterns brought about in the individual by success and pleasure and reinforced by habit, is perfectly compatible with science; so is any other so-called purpose that can be explained as having its roots in the past. It is finalism that is incompatible with science. Such finalism is openly professed by McDougall, Jung, and Adler; it is really implied in the Psychology of Freud, though this may be denied.
Of scientists of all kinds it may be noted that if they believe in a failure of determinism, and in the occurrence of intervention, it is generally in provinces outside the one within which they have devoted themselves to the establishment of order. If in their own field it is only in a vague and negative way as a substitute for confession of ignorance. No worker in natural science really proposes to solve its problems by introduction of subjective or supernatural concepts, or thinks himself liable to reconcile objective findings with revealed accounts.
There is a curious tendency among workers in physical science to take for granted that airy flights into conceptualism which they would not tolerate themselves, are indispensable features of psychology, e.g. to accept the whole Freudian hierarchy as discoveries not inventions. It is particularly common to assume that determinism in psychology is impossible. If it were so, a scientific psychology would be impossible; but this defeatism seems premature.
RECENT PREVALENCE OF ANIMIST PSYCHOLOGIES IN ENGLAND
A trinity of doctrines has predominated in England during the past generation, those of McDougall, those of the psycho-analytic school (especially Freud) and Hart's apologia for the first two. It is worth considering what constitutes unity of this trinity, what its general influence has been, and, very briefly, what are the distinctive features of each person of it.
Resemblances and differences exist in three respects:--(1) In choice of subject matter.
(2) In relative prominence of interpretation in proportion to strictly objective observation.
(3) In metaphysical standpoint.
(1) Subject matter.-Of each of the above psychologies it may be be said that its subject matter consists almost exclusively of subjective processes, i.e. changes in consciousness and the alleged activities of hypothetical entities of a non-physical kind, termed " Instincts," the Unconscious Mind et alia. Despite differences, the aim of all is thus to give a self-contained account of the sequence of subjective processes. For none is behavioutr, i.e. the objective aspect of psychology, of comparable interest; this may be affirmed despite references in definitions of psychology by McDougall and by Hart to behaviour which are not borne out by the rest of their writings.
(2) Relative paucity of observation and prominence of interpretation.-Of McDougall and Hart it may be said that they hardly purport to be concerned with the making of original observations. Their work consists almost entirely of interpretation, i.e. of classification and conceptual formulation of previously known phenomena.
No doubt it takes all sorts to make a world of psychologists, but the influence upon the weaker brethren of this wealth of interpretation with such scarcity of observation is surely unfortunate. It seems to foster in them a misconception of the duty of a psychologist, an under-valuation of factual data and a tendency to contentment with speculation and with translation of platitudes into jargon.
It is not true in the same obvious way of the psycho-analytic school that their contribution lacks record of observational data; but here the auestion arises how far the method of observation is invalidated by the intrusion of pre-conceptions. Here it may be said that almost the whole emphasis is on selective retrospection and that this tends to be guided by the principle that nothing is too banal to be momentous, if only it is sufficiently remote.
(3) Metaphysical standpoint.-All the persons of this trinity are idealists, though each of a different variety. All profess animism; for all alike the first business of psychology is to save its soul.
McDougall upholds psycho-phvsical interactionism. He is clearly aware of the difficulties of this position and his defence of the case for the soul is apt to remind one of the apology of the housemaid for her love child on the ground that it was such a little one.
Psycho-analysis is clearly based on psycho-physical parallelism; this is explicitly confirmed by Flugel. He makes no reference to the difficulties of this form of dualism which, except by psycho-analysts, has been almost universally abandoned. This theory of the coincidence without contact of the physical and conscious series implies a continuous and meaningless miracle, unless the two are unified (as by Descartes) through reference to a universal spirit or deity.
Hart started, like Freud, with psycho-physical parallelism; later he abandoned this, probably for the reason above given. His attitude towards Freud implies some form of animism. In his Presidential Address Hart seemed to display a leaning towards the subjective idealism professed by Eddington and Jeans.
In his " Philosophy of Psychiatry" Hart said: "Historically the physiological conception of insanity arose as a reaction against the theological and metaphysical explanations of the middle ages." In view of this it is fair to draw attention to the theological implications of all animism. Freud and Hart avoid discussion of these. But one cannot thus tactfully play the metaphysical ostrich. The phenomenalist who admits that any relation of conscious and physical events, except an empirical one, is an unsolved mystery can leave the matter there, but the animist cannot decline to follow to their logical conclusions the assumptions which he has imported into science. McDougall affirms that panpsychism is the inevitable corollary of all forms of animism but his own. I believe that competent philosophers would agree with his rule, but not with his exception. The question will be dealt. with again later. The matter is of the utmost practical importance. Without some such unifying intervention, mental heredity would be totally incompatible with any one of the three metaphysics of this trinity.
FREUD
It is impossible to make more than a brief mention of certain general characters of Freud's teaching which are relevant to my theme. This necessary limitation may suggest a wholly critical attitude; this would be misleading. Of the brilliance of Freud's intellect there is no question. I suggest, however, that his thought is that of the artist, not the psychiatrist. His theories are full of that eclectic emphasis which is the very essence of art, and remote from the dispassionate evaluation of all facts alike which is the ideal of science. Indeed one may suggest that Freud has brought to science the mind of a poet with the defects of its qualities. To a more romantic age, before progress had taught us that art has little to do with beauty, the term poet might have seemed an odd one to apply to the author of the theories of anal erotism and penis envy. But of Freud at least it is true that his study is that of emotion recollected in tranquillity, and to him seem to apply Mathew Arnold's words-" The poet sees not deep but wide." Freud, in fact, displays an amazing fertility in picturesque and arresting generalization, coupled with no comparable gift for seeing objections, limitations or exceptions.
I propose here only to indicate why the methods of observation which Freud has devised seem unfitted to provide evidence that is valid for science.
(1) Psycho-analysis is fatally handicapped by its privacy; one cannot be detective, advocate, jury and judge in the same case-the case of the scientific adequacy of psycho-analysis. The history of miracles and witchcraft has finally settled the status in science of any mass of alleged fact that cannot be submitted to verification by the sceptical. The size of this mass and the number of believers does not matter; mythologies, especially if brightened by pornography, have never throughout history lacked worshippers, and unless human nature radically changes, they never will.
One sees Freud compared to Galileo. Would-be Galileos should remember that he created modern science by asserting the priority as evidence of verifiable observation (capable of being publicly repeated and analysed by experiment) over tradition, speculation and authority.
(2) Critics have always contended that the observational methods of psychoanalysis warped its findings. No patient is ever free from knowledge of what is expected: however painstakingly an analyst abstains from conscious intervention, any patient between whom and the analyst there has deliberately been fostered a relation resembling love must intuitively note what gladdens. As to analysts, how could they be unbiased critics of their findings ? Obviously only those who incline to the known doctrines of psycho-analysis take it up. They are taught that it is only possible to observe phenomena and to see them in a true light after a suitable novitiate. Yet critics are asked to accept that only those who are thus disposed to belief in the doctrines of psycho-analysis by strong emotional bias and material interests are fitted to discuss them, though often the question which arises does not concern expert observations of phellomena, but is one of logic that would make a lawyer laugh.
(3) As to the requirement that a science should be capable of development on quantitative lines, psycho-analysis makes a unique merit of freedom from this potentiality.
Rickman at the conclusion of his book says: "The tendency of psychiatry up to the present time has been to turn for help to the physical sciences which resolve themselves to number, measure and scales.
. Psycho-analysis now has to offer another method which does not enumerate, measure or weigh; it deals only with presentations in the mind, how they interact and how they take effect in behaviour." Galileo doubted whether any idea which did not lend itself to measurement could be regarded with certainty as corresponding to anything outside the mind of the thinker.
It is obvious, of course, that psycho-analysis in enunciating any of its theories (e.g. those about paranoia) makes not the slightest attempt to support these with statistical evidence.
HART'S PLEA FOR THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND OF FREUD
Of Hart's first paper relevant to the topic of this article, namely, "The Philosophy of Psychiatry," I still hold that the reading of it should be compulsory for the incipient psychiatrist.
Thereafter Hart seems to have gone astray in attempting to prove that Freud conforms to those requirements of science which Hart himself had propounded with such lucidity. It appears that the clue to this acclamation of Freud is that like Jeans and Eddington, Hart is profoundly attached in feeling to universals as realities and is an axiomatic animist. Intellectually he is nominalist enough to admit that the Unconscious Mind is a conceptual device. But he never betrays any awareness that Mind as a whole, or to put it more plainly the Soul, needs defence as a subsisting entity, or that others may regard it as merely a collective term for events. Nevertheless, the crucial question is the legitimacy as a scientific concept not merely of the Unconscious but of Mind in the idealist sense with all consequences which follow assumption of this.
First it is necessary to say, that against accounts of the sequence of consciousness in terms denoting conscious experience and in these alone, as approximations, there is nothing to be said. But the conscious and physical correlates of any mental process are one totality. It is not a question of an account of the one or the other being more nearly ultimate, as for example a physical explanation in terms of electrons might be thought more nearly ultimate than a chemical one in terms of atoms: it is rather that an account of both consciousness and behaviour and their correlation are essential for the completeness and finality of any psychology. If so, what merit is there in schemes that foster a lasting segregation in virtuc of the fact that the conscious phenomena are eked out and linked by conceptual entities such as could never be correlated with physical equivalents.
Hart's argument for the Unconscious Mind of Freud consists essentially in the plea that it is purely conceptual, but that it makes possible a presentation of psycho-logical events as a continuum, and so a wholly independent psychology. But who desires such a psychology ? To my mind it is as scientific and fruitful to demand that psychology and physiology shall be dealt with as entirely independent sequences, as it would be to idealize a meteorology which ignored astronomy, in which reference to the Earth and Sun were forbidden and in which sequence and combinations of weather which were actually observed, must be referred to the interaction of an entity termed Perceptible Climate with another termed Imperceptible Climate.
Actually Hart's defence is not valid at all for the Unconscious as understood by Freud and his followers themselves. If the Unconscious were just an explanatory device, then clearly the psychologist would be presented with a clean slate on which he could write as the content of the Unconscious whatever met his purpose, rubbing out and re-writing as seemed useful from time to time.
This would be the logical consequence of admitting the Unconscious to be an invention not a discovery. Hart may be defending such an Unconscious Mind that it is entirely formless and devoid of fixed content; if so, it is not the Freudian version. The psychoanalyst will have none of this depopulation of Everyman's private inferno. He peoples the Unconscious with inmates of most definite habits.
Hart recognizes that most Freudians do not join him in regarding the Unconscious Mind as a symbol, device or faqon de parler. In his address he says, "My psycho-analytic friends, however, have frequently castigated me for expressing this latter view, and stoutly maintain that the Unconscious processes are of precisely the same order as Conscious processes." These we are all agreed are phenomena. Then follows a remarkable sentence. Probably the difference between us can ultimately be resolved into a question of words without much practical significance." In his previous paragraph, Hart had asserted that Freud's Unconscious Mind and all its parts were concepts, and that this introduction of concepts marked an epoch and constituted Freud's greatness. Freud and his followers flatly deny that they are concepts, asserting that they have objective existence. This makes of the theory a mythology. Yet we are asked to continue belief in the greatness of the achievement. Surely this is carrying too far the genial theory that we all mean the same thing really.
ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR IDEALISM FROM PHYSICS
Of recent years there has been a tendency for idealists in psychology and psychiatry to look for support to physicists of the same kidney, proclaiming their views as the philosophy of modern science.
Hart quotes with approval this passage from Sir James Jeans: "To-day there is a wide measure of agreement which on the physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity that the stream of knowledge is leading towards a nonmechanical reality. The universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine. Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as the governor and creator of matter." What Sir Arthur Eddington stresses is mainly the principle of indeterminacy. The significance attached to this by idealists devoted to scientific defeatism depends on misrepresentation of the real meaning of a technical difficulty and upon a pun. The word "determination" can be used with two meanings, that of causation in the scientific sense or that of ascertainment. The principle of indeterminacy is not truly an assertion of the inherent inconstancy of the events in nature atnd their lack of adequate determinants, but the confession of our incapacity to predict certain events in terms of such concepts as we have up to date. This may depend on complexity of interacting causes or upon insufficient delicacy of measurement. We have not in some respects reached the capacity to formulate observed events with our present conceptions of space and time.
43q Section of Psychiatry By Jeans and Eddington we are asked to accept as the philosophy of science the sort of idealism which with all its consequences was set forth by Berkeley and of which (until Jeans and Eddington) he was perhaps the most widely known exponent in this country. Of Berkeley, Bertrand Russell says that he was not only a Bishop, but an Irishman, so we must not be too hard on him. Science has not been swept off its feet by this age-old doctrine. In its favour there seems nothing particularly new, except some misrepresentations based upon punning as to the theorogical consequences of so-called indeterminacy, and some fresh applications of the principle most popular among savages that what is not understood can always be explained animistically. Bertrand Russell by 1931 had already published a devastating commentary on these views of Eddington and Jeans. As he says, Eddington deduces religion from the fact that atoms do not obey the laws of mathematics; Jeans deduces it from the fact that they do.
REPUDIATION OF SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM BY EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICISTS
The mutually contradictory arguments by which Jeans and Eddington lead us back to the revealed doctrines from which they obviously started, have of course obtained a wide popular vogue as the conclusions of science.
What of the claim to the almost unanimous agreement of other physicists? This claim surely breathes the spirit rather of the pulpit and the political platform than of the laboratory and the lecture room. Democracy has not so far pervaded physics as to have established the referendum as the criterion of truth. Meanwhile, in view of the aristocratic temper which prevails in science, it seems careless to have overlooked Einstein, Max Planck and Lord Rutherford. The reply has not been long delayed. In " Where is Science going," Einstein explicitly describes the idea that he agrees with the subjective idealism championed by such modern scientists as Eddington as be-ing ridiculous. Further, he writes: " You must distinguish between the physicist and the litterateur when both professions are combined into one. In England you have a great English literature and a great discipline of style. What I mean is that there are scientific writers in England who are illogical and romantic in their popular books, but in their scientific work they are acute logical reasoners." Again Einstein says "We must distinguish between what is a literary fashion and what is scientific pronouncement. These men are genuine scientists, and their literary formulations must not be taken as expressive of their scientific convictions. Why should anybody go to the trouble of gazing at the stars if he did not believe that the stars were really there ?"
As to determinism, Einstein says " Much of the misunderstanding encountered in all this question of causation is due to the rather rudimentary formulation of the causal principle which has been in vogue till now. I believe that events in nature are controlled by a much stricter and more closely binding law than we suspect to-day, when we speak of one event being the cause of another. Quantum physics has presented us with complex processes, and to meet them we must enlarge and refine our concept of causality.
As to indeterminism, Einstein says
The indeterminism which belongs to quantum physics is subjective indeterminism. I am entirely in agreement with what Planck has said and written. Ile admits the impossibility of applying the causal principle to the inner processes of atomic physics in the present state of knowledge. But he has set himself definitely against the thesis that from this inapplicability we are to conclude that the process of causation does not exist in external reality. And when you mention people who speak of such a thing as free-will in nature, it is difficult for me to find a suitable reply; the idea is of course preposterous."
OCT.-PSYCH. 2 * The claim of Jeans to unanimous agreement with his subjective idealism is so far from true that the greatest physicists living, while aware that they have no direct knowledge of anything but their own conscious processes, profess a personal belief, recognized as such, in the existence and in the objective determinacy of external events which these conscious processes do not mirror but betoken. As to this, of course it should be said that it does not amount to a belief that their current physical concepts, such as atoms or electrons or quanta, necessarily have objective existence or are other than the most convenient symbols so far devised for expressing the sequence of processes.
THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANIMISM It is accepted by everyone who has seriously thought about it that absolute idealism or panpsychism is a logically inevitable corollary of every form of animism; in words of one syllable, as soon as one says that to sum up the facts one needs a soul, one is bound to bring in a God as well. If so, can the concept of animism be tolera.ted as part of the method of science with its limited objective? As concepts of science, both Soul and God are utterly destructive of the causalism that is its essence. Hart himself has quoted Galileo's saying: "The Will of God explains nothing, because it explains everything."
Standing alone, subjective idealism is an absurdity, a sort of collective solipsism,
If the universe only existed as processes of the human mind, there could be no question of a universe proceeding or outlasting human thinking. As to this, of course, the usual view is more nearly expressed by the description of human history as a brief and discreditable episode in the life of a minor planet. The whole of science obviously points to the conclusion that only after the universe had undergone an evolution of unimaginable duration could the mind of man have arisen. The only answer of a purely subjective idealism to this quandary would be to suppose that science is nonsense, that the appearance of an evolution preceding man is itself an illusion of the human mind. If so, what evidence would there be that the apparent sequence of events since the origin of human consciousness was not equally illusion of the uttermost kind ?
Absolute idealism transfers responsibility for existence to the Mind of God making the Mind of humanity a part of this. Eddington and Jeans, having recognized the needs of subjective idealism, manfully took the theological plunge. Eddington closes a chapter with the statement that modern physics can be summarized in the formula, " And God said let there be light." The absolute idealism of Jeans is thus expressed: "We have already considered with disfavour the possibility of the universe having been planned by a biologist or engineer; from the intrinsic evidence of his creation, the Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician."
Here the psychiatrist will recognize with amusing simplicity the mechanism projection. It is a long way from Jehovah to super-Jeans and the journey has taken over 3,000 years, but nothing could better exemplify the slowness of evolution than the constancy of the mechanism which gave us the vindictive oriental tyrant of the earlier scriptures and now gives us the Great Mathematician of 1930.
SCIENTIFIC DEFEATISM
The idealists who believe, contrary to Einistein, Planck, Rutherford and others, that indeterminism is not a measure of our ignorance, but inherent in events, proclaim now a limitation to the province of inductive science, as this has always been proclaimed by the religious. Jung is particularly emphatic concerning the limitations of the scientific method in psychology. Hart says that'we must realize that the method of science is not a unique key to knowledge and that no responsible scientist would dream of making such a claim. I think this double assertion may at once be disputed. It may well be questioned whether there is any alternative method if we distinguish belief from knowledge and unless we grant the power of revelation or intuition to provide knowledge as opposed to belief. Hart writes as if mathematical formulations were an alternative to an inductive science; they are supplementary and suggestive of further inductive work, but never alternative. A mathematical formulation (such as the periodic table) may suggest the search for missing elements, but can never find them.
Mathematics may present phenomenal facts in a new pattern, but by mathematics one can no more acquire knowledge of phenomenal fact than one can createcoloured glass by rattling the kaleidoscope. This applies to psychology as much as to geology.
POSSIBILITY OF A NOMINALIST PSYCHOLOGY
Banishment from scientific psychology of mystical subsisting entities, Souls and Minds (whether conscious or otherwise) by no means banishes the possibility of a science of consciousness. On the contrary it creates it. The true aim should be a psychology which hasno more connexion with animism than has geology or than, in the hands of its experimental workers, has modern physics. Psychology should be as far as possible constructed in bare terms of perceptible events. When concepts are introduced,either they must be of the verifiable type or their nature as collective symbols should be declared beyond doubt. Conscious events whether in ourselves or others are equally phenomena, if we disregard solipsist quibbles. Such phenomena are equally material for scientific treatment, whether they appear to be immediately referable to some external source or not. A scientific psychology would regard causalistic description oftne sequence of processes of consciousness and of behaviour and of the attempt to correlate these as its triple objective. Any account of such sequences would of course persistently represent the two sets of phenomena as empirically correlated in an unknown way. It should not be framed in terms in which sensations are said to reside or occur in the cortex; equally it should not be said that behaviour made up of objective processes is determined by volitions, i.e. subjective events.
We are confronted with problem of definition: what are the limits to which the term " behaviour " is applicable? may be suggested as the best working basis for psychiatry: (1) That the term "behaviour " should be used to connote reactions, involving a synthesis that is or formerly was accompanied by consciousness;
(2) that with may be coupled the complementary view that consciousness is always and only awareness of behaviour, i.e. awareness of happenings of a certain synthetic complexity one's own body and can be nothing else. This view of course differs entirely extreme form of behaviourism which adopts the attitude that after the description behaviour there is nothing left to describe or worth description, that consciousness either does not exist or the less said about it the better.
CONTINUITY OF NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY
suggest as the greatest need of normal and morbid psychology emphasis continuity with neurology (using the term to cover psychology pathology the nervous system). Here one comes to an outstanding the animist and nominalist school in psychiatry.
has been by -a well-known English psycho-analyst that the special study of neurology should form no part of the training of a psychiatrist.
Hart psychology as "
An attempt toi explain the behaviour and mental processes of a patient by conceptions built out of the stuff of subjective experience."
But it is impossible to explain behaviour which is a sequence of objective phenomena in terms of subjective experience or of conceptions built out of their " stuff." This limitation of the term psychology would exclude behaviour entirely from its scope. Later Hart said " The researches of Pavlov, and the immensely important conceptions to which they have led, belong to the sphere of physiology and the behaviouristic psychology, which has been built on these conceptions, is not psychology in the sense in which the word is employed in this address. It does not attempt to interpret phenomena in terms of subjective experience; on the contrary it expressly declines to have anything to do with subjective experience and constructs its conceptions on a mechanistic stimulus-response system, which is clearly and entirely couched in the language of physiology."
It must be remembered that Pavlov's researches do not concern only internal components of behaviour innervated by the vegetative nervous system, such as salivation, but also the excitation and inhibition by stimuli of such reactions as the " defence reflexes" (e.g. the rejection of a substance from the mouth) and the " investigatory response " (e.g. raising the head and pricking up the ears to catch sounds). With these there is every usual reason to suppose that consciousness is associated. If these responses are not the business of psychology, then behaviour is none of its business.
Watsonian behaviourism, which was an attempt to apply Pavlov's principles in psychology and psychiatry, failed because of certain gratuitous exaggerations. These vitiated behaviourism, but it had merits. Among these were its insistence on strict objectivity and on the principle that what we term consciousness is awareness of responses of our own bodies (which may be only incipient). To my mind Golla's work strongly supports that aspect of behaviourism. Hart in defining psychology seems to err in a manner diametrically opposite to Watson. The study of behaviour is part of the triple task of psychology and at the same time the business of the upper reaches of neurology. Here the two sciences merge and become indistinguishable as do physics and chemistry. Further, continuity and comprehensiveness demand that the explanation of the objective facts of behaviour, both normal and abnormal, shall be framed as far as possible as an upward continuance of those principles (reached by observation, experiment, and induction) which account for responses mediated by lower levels of the nervous system. As a matter of observation the analogies are obvious. It is hard to idealize a theory that makes of these analogies a meaningless miracle. But to the extent that it is admitted that they are more, we have a confession that determination of the form of normal responses or of symptoms is a function of the constitution of the central nervous system. How then do without neurology ? For my part I venture to think that the ancestors of the psychology of the future will be such investigators as Hughlings Jackson, Sherrington, Head, Pavlov, and Lashley, rather than Freud, Jung and Adler.
Because of their objectivity and amenability to formulation of their sequences in terms of verifiable hypotheses, the facts of behaviour lend themselves better to scientific investigation than do those of consciousness. Theories covering behaviour almost necessarily involve induction of formule covering likewise reactions at lower levels. Such formulee seem capable of submission to the sort of crucial tests which are essential. Tracing, in this manner, analogies and differences between activities mediated by different levels of the nervous system seems more likely to be fruitful than speculations in terms of an isolated conscious series which cannot be put to any test. It is with full knowledge of their speculative quality that I suggest in a tentative way sample hypotheses couched in neurological terms and representing possible alternatives to accounting for the form of symptoms in terms based on the assumption of interaction between conscious and unconscious mind.
If we search for formulae couched in terms of process rather than of alleged subsisting entity and covering alike: (1) combination and sequence of physical symptoms in organic nervous disease; (2) combination and sequence of anomalies of behaviour and its conscious correlates, then the fiist and most obvious principles offering in outline a general explanation are those of Hughlings Jackson. These include the principles that ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis, that devolution reverses evolution (both ontogenetic and phylogenetic), that there is always a, combination of facilitation and control in all action mediated by the central nervous system and in consequence that there are always deprivation and decontrol symptoms as the result of any lesion of it. Some of these principles anticipate in exact words some of the metaphors of Freud. Applicability of such principles is one difficulty of animistic theories of neuroses and psychoses. Another is -the frequent identity of syndromes caused by the grossest organic lesions with those which (as a cloak for ignorance) we term functional.
Deprivations.-Can the deprivations which follow impairment of the highest mental level be analysed into components for which a structural basis might reasonably be sought ? Spearman's work may afford a clue worth following. He gives a list of ten kinds of relations, the discriminations of which are the elements constituting the whole process of cognition. He says: "Of these relations, three are ideal, being those of resemblance, evidence and conjunction. Seven are real, those of space, time objectivity, identity, attribution, causation, and constitution." A very similar classification of elementary cognitive discriminations is to be found in " Pragmatism" by William James. Systematic analysis of the efficiency of such discriminations in psychiatry seems worth while (if practically applicable tests can be devised) and might well be correlated with anatomical studies in cases where defect in one or other element is outstanding.
Among the commonest features of mental disorder is the failure in some degree to discriminate between the outer world and what is and pertains to the self (introjection and projection in the limited psychiatric sense). The forms and degrees of such error are legion.-The reduction of capacity to make the judgment is obviously due toa---physical factor, e.g. alcohol or infectious toxamia in many cases. But we know hardly anything of the physical basis or of the data of correct judgment. Such problems can only be solved by abandoning speculation, except as a starting point to be supplemented by the most painstaking and critical observation of phenomena.
Decontrol.-Balances and coordinations normally obtain between functions at any one level of the nervous system. These modes of balance and coordination can be classified under certain general headings: some at least of such general headings of classification (e.g. "reciprocal innervation" ; "projection ") will be found applicable at various levels of the nervous system, including the mental levels. At each level alike it is possible to classify some symptoms as errors of this or that mode of balance or coordination and so to trace an analogy between symptoms at different levels. Failures of control from above are apt to lead to maladjustments which can be analysed as composed in varying measure of these standard modes of deviation. A hint of the meaning intended by these dark generalities may perhaps be conveyed by examples. Reciprocal innervation and contract. This is illustrated alike in the spinal reflexes and in the movements mediated by the cortex; on the motor side, chorea and athetosis appear to be due to defect of such reciprocal control between movements of cortical origin.
Much that occurs in psychiatry suggests existence of reciprocal innervation between the processes that form its province and also that disturbance of this may be the nature of symptoms commonly ascribed to decontrol.
It seems to be a general rule that emotional mechanisms exist in pairs (comparable to innervation of agonist and antagonist muscle-groups or to the neural bases for vision of complementary colours) and that between the pair reciprocal innervation obtains. In fact it is probable that, just as in voluntary movement combination of reciprocally innervating agonist and antagonists, synergic action, associated movements, and movements of cooperation are required, so for balanced emotional response coordination of several emotional mechanisms is necessary, not the simple activity of one.
Consideration of these principles might throw light upon such psychiatric facts as ambivalence, obsessional doubt, and some emotional oddities of the schizophrenic. Though some of these are individually conditioned by specially significant experience, it may be unduly elaborate to suppose that they are so in every case. Some might be more analogous to chorea.
Between neural processes on the afferent side, there appears to exist an adjustment analogous to that termed "reciprocal innervation" on the efferent; this adjustment underlying the occurrence of contrast, whether simultaneous or successive (as exemplified in colour vision, among many instances). The analogies between the phenomena of contrast and those of ideational overcompensation, as seen in grandiose delusions, are too obvious to need labouring. The same principle may possibly be exemplified in the precipitation of " Laughter in court," of the shrieking merriment of the thwarted hysteric and of reactive mania. A study of the general principles governing appearance of contrast phenomena and the prevention or termination of these might be of value.
Faulty projection.-If one uses the term Projection, not in its limited psychiatric sense, but to mean reference of any afferent stimulus to its source and adaptive reaction according to its source, then faulty projection is illustrated at many levels in terms of purely objective response. It is exemplified by the retention of urine which may follow operation on the anal canal and by the erection which is prone to occur (especially in sleep) with a full bladder and which may lead to emission and erotic dreams. There is a transition from such impersonal phenomena via all that has been observed concerning more individual conditioning of responses, to higher objective anomalies, such as schizophrenic mannerisms, tics, compulsive acts (including sexual perversions) and so to irrationalities which more or less unwittingly everyone of us daily performs.
If we look rather to the subjective than to the objective side of the same matter, we could perhaps trace the same continuity in principle from reference of visceral stimuli to the somatic, instead of the splanchnic, territory of a given spinal root, to reference of pain from a diseased hip to a healthy knee and so up through conditioned affective reponses, phobias and other obsessive emotions to the more complex prejudices which all of us feel with insight varying according to our current endowment of humour. Any obscurity in the analogies depends largely on the fact that at lower levels even the errors are dependent on innate connexions, and standardized, while, increasingly with ascent of the nervous system, symptoms become post-natally conditioned and thus individual.
In the above discussion of faults of reciprocal innervation and of projection, errors in a certain direction have been regarded as analogous regardless of timerelations, especially regardless of duration. This seems justified, although the reasons for 'such time differences are themselves problems of the first importance. Probably they are due in part to constitution of lower and higher levels of the nervous system, in part to factors external to it.
Passing to individual features of syndromes, the work of Pavlov goes far to explain these and in my opinion, though difficulties exist in its application to man, steady painstaking work on similar lines is the most promising foundation for a rational psychopathology and psychotherapy of the future. Pavlov fully recognizes the existence of individual differences, both permanent and transient, in the character of the responses determined by conditioning in different dogs. Thus there is every facility for introducing into atiology all sorts of other factors as well as the stimulus or experience-a soil as well as the seed. Pavlov has shown how, by what may reasonably be termed mental conflict, conditions resembling psychoses can be induced and how these vary accordingto the personality of the dog.
As to individual symptoms (obsessions and symbolisms of all kinds) more understanding is obtainable from consideration in the light of Pavlov's principles than in any other ways. Finally, his principles indicating the modes of conditioning and inhibiting particular responses correspond largely to the sort of rival methods in psychotherapy which have prevailed from time to time. This suggests the possibility of experimental work to determine accurately the province and efficacy of each such method.
Here it is necessary to say that human thinking cannotbe totally explained without residue in formulie summarizing what dis seen in connexion with the estab- Neurology illustrates abundantly the following principles:
(1) Any one mechanism responsible for a characteristic syndrome may be affected by one of many nocuous factors (as in the epilepsies, the choreas, the Parkinsonisms).
(2) Any one nocuous factor may in a single case or in different cases affect several mechanisms, i.e. produce several syndromes (e.g. in epidemic encephalitis, in neurosyphilis, in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis).
(3) The influence of nocuous factor may render a mechanism susceptible to *the influence of a second, and such complexity and multiplicity of cause is so common as to be almost the rule.
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(4) There is such complex reciprocal connexion between each neuron system and others (e.g. between pyramidal, striatal, cerebellar and rubrospinal) that a lesion affecting primarily one such system inevitably causes repercussions in a number of others, even in the absence of any direct operation of the nocuous factor on other systems.
For the last reason alone, apart from any other, it is hardly conceivable that a neurological syndrome can be pure and the same is true of psychiatric syndromes.
Neglect of the lessons of neurology results, for psychiatry, in a textbook isolation of syndromes that is fantastically remote from anything seen clinically and in a search for unitary causes and unitary cures of such syndromes which is as naive and as futile as the quest for the elixir of life. This is generally admitted in respect of what are termed psychoses, but the psychotherapist stops when the sacred distinction between neuroses and psychoses is endangered. This is a wholly false antithesis. The defenders jump about from a general admission that commonly there is cooperation between psychogenesis and other causes (heredity, epochs, physical influences) to an attitude that neuroses are completely explained without residue by such theories as those of Freud, and that certain psychoses, though totally different, will be so explained later. The occurrence of one of the syndromes known as neuroses in pure form and entirely psychogenic is possible to conceive. As a clinical fact it is probably much rarer than occurrence in nature of a pure element unmixed and uncompounded. Every syndrome, whether neurotic or psychotic, so far as isolation is justified at all, corresponds to a reaction pattern of the organism, and each such reaction pattern can be impaired, released or overactivated for a multitude of reasons, some functional," others " organic." There is little doubt that dimly, perhaps secretly, most of those draWing definite distinctions between neuroses and psychoses are influenced by animist ideas, by beliefs that in neurosis a disordered mind is acting through an intact body or through a body that is only disordered in a secondary and transient way. In fact, to patients and to lay audiences they will openly say that neuroses are disorders of the mind, not of the body. This is, of course, as absurd as the contradictory distinction about the same conditions, "It's not his mind, it's only his nerves." But serious practical issues, such as the efficacy of psychotherapy alone in producing permanent cures depend on whether these animist views are correct. If not, if neuroses are all comparable to conditioning, it may be taken as certain that permanent liabilities will survive any such method.
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH IN PSYCHIATRY
It has been widely suggested that the number of those suffering from psychological disabilities which could be medically helped is about ten million cases in Great Britain, there being about 60 or 70 minor cases for every major one. For the cases, though minor in severity, which form the large majority in number, some seem to hold that there is no effective treatment but psycho-analysis. Personally I cannot believe that the task of the next generation is the spread of psycho-analysis among the lower classes. It would seem cheaper, following Harvey, to seek out the secrets of human nature by way of experiment. So far expenditure is grossly improvident in this respect. The needs of psychiatry are simple and only twomen and money.-Money-getting is, of course, no topic for a contribution like this, so the discussion can be almost limited to that of getting men. What is wanted in psychiatry is what was recognized as the need of general medicine by the late Sir Walter Fletcher.
The first point to emphasize is that opinion concerning psychiatry in England is far too largely formed by those in practice. Therefore, not only is it unduly optimistic, but of a kind which dispenses with the laborious observation and experiment that forms the basis of every progressive science. It must be recognized that under modern conditions really important research cannot be a hobby for the leisure of those in either institutional or private practice. The army of science cannot be a militia; techniques are too difficult. Likewise it cannot be entirely a short service army. There is in England (or probably could be found) as much money for research fellowships in psychiatry tenable during a year or two as is needed for any available men upon whom money could profitably be spent in this way; there is a deplorable lack of long-term endowment of research.
The same was found to some extent in general medicine. Here at least those who had done brief research went out into private practice with added prestige and greater chance of a hospital post. There is no hope of any such reward in psychiatry, and indeed many of those who would serve it best in the laboratory are not well suited to wards or consulting-rooms. Men are needed for whom research in psychiatry shall provide a career comparable with that which their fellows of firstclass ability achieve in practice; a career at least providing the chance of giving their children as good an education as themselves. Such men will have to be paid to do research only, interrupted by nothing but the training of other research workers, protected against overloading with elementary teaching. At present there are, so far as I know, only one or two such posts in this country; hence the shortage of light and leading.
In general medicine there is a steady movement in the direction of creating such positions. Results from the units at certain teaching hospitals had been rather disappointing because the leaders of them have been overloaded with elementary teaching. To overcome this there have been founded at University College Hospital one post financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, at the National Hospital another financed by the Medical Research Council, to provide real careers for men doing nothing but research and the direction of this. Power has been taken to divert some of the income of the Beit Trust from payment of short-term fellowships to provision of similar careers in research. This is only a beginning in general medicine and it is the sort of thing we cannot afford not to do on a large scale in psychiatry. £50,000 a year would go quite a long way. We need at leading Universities about half a dozen Institutes of Psychiatry with access to early cases. These should be comparable to such an organization as the School of Agriculture at Cambridge, to which the Rockefeller Foundation gave, I believe, half a million pounds. Each Institute of Psychiatry should provide careers for half a dozen real experts in branches of science relevant to psychiatry, in psychology of the right type, in anatomy-especially of the experimental kind-in physics, in biochemistry, in genetics and in sociology.
Personally I think there should be no attempt to look for the holders of most of these positions in the ranks of psychiatrists, because it is certain that men with knowledge of the frontier of one of these sciences will not also be a psychiatrist. But I think each of those selected for knowledge of a particular science should have a training for a year or two in psychiatry, so that he shall have a live feeling about its real problems. Last, but certainly not least, in the team would be a fully trained and expert psychiatrist in active charge of a large number of patients, who would check the ever-present danger upon which Sir Walter Fletcher insisted 6a laboratory research growing academic and remote, and concerning itself with problems that may be significant next century. It is vital that there should be several suich institutes, so that opinion may never be dominated by one school of thought. I would even have one specially for animists if only they could be induced to accept sufficient
